The federal legislation mandating Professional Standards Review Organizations to monitor the decision making o f physicians regarding their patients is a method unique to the United States to control medical care costs according to prevailing professional criteria. Other countries, so far, depend largely on health service structures, reim bursement methods, and arbitrary government budget limitations. Our dislike of highly structured delivery systems has pragmatically moved us in the direction of monitoring diagnostic and therapeutic decision making. PSRO is mandated at a time when there is no systematic methodology with validated criteria for monitoring medical practice. This will likely lead to subtle sabotage o f PSRO by the medical profession justified by quality standards which are the professions' prerogative.
Summer 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q something! PSRO is a prime example of this very American, activist philosophy. I start with an international perspective.
In the management of the health services delivery system the United States is unique among countries in that we are moving directly into monitoring the decision making of doctors. I believe this is so because we lack the health services organizational struc tures and relatively closed-ended financing true of European health insurance or health services systems, particularly that of Great Brit ain or Scandinavia. Even with more structure than in the United States, costs in all countries have gone up faster than other segments of their economies. It may seem an anomaly that I find no relationship between ownership, sources of funding, the organi zational structure of health, and the amount a country spends for health services. The factor establishing the limits is the implicit and explicit public policy on how much a country wants to spend for health services. This amount is in the main a political decision in the murky area of tradeoffs in resource allocation among parties at in terest. Until very recently the sky seemed to be the limit, but now health services expenditures are beginning to nudge both governmen tal and private budgeting limits. Even so, only one country is actual ly retrenching-Great Britain-and mainly because of the dif ficulties that country is having with its economy. Great Britain would actually spend more if it could in relation to other priorities. Other countries are not yet retrenching, but agonizing over slowing the pace of increases in expenditures even though their Gross National Products (GNP) may still be expanding. No country has dared to find out what the saturation level of demand would be. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that there is such a saturation level as is true of all goods and services. The country which appears to be closest to the saturation level is the Soviet Union as measured by the lavish number of units of service provided per person as com pared with North America and Western European countries. In general, countries in North American and Western Europe reveal about four to six visits per person a year to physicians, whereas the Soviet Union reports 10 visits and is making projections to 16 in the near future (Anderson, 1973; Pustovoy, 1975) , with a commensurate increase in resources. The Soviet norms are set by medical profes sionals and such norms are inherently generous.
I wish to elaborate on my first statement, i.e., that the United States is unique in moving directly into monitoring the decision making of doctors. The reasons for this, I believe, are that costs were rising rapidly at the same time that some form of national health in surance was being considered seriously, plus our painful expen ditures experience with Medicare. These took place in a context of very vague organizational and fiscal boundaries. We do not like visi ble boundaries and structures with visible limits on budgets, although we are-as are other countries-moving ineluctably in that direction. The pace in each country is a matter of degree.
It seems that we are hoping that a properly functioning PSRO mechanism will establish for us the proper level of expenditures, rather than have the level of expenditures determined arbitrarily from year to year by the processes of government budgeting, com peting with the national priorities. It is then ironical that in this country the medical profession faces more direct monitoring of its decision making prerogatives than do its colleagues in government systems elsewhere. This is due in part-if you can believe it-to greater deference shown to doctors in European systems. Nevertheless, health administrators and politicians in Europe are looking enviously at the PSRO developments in the United States and naturally exaggerating their impact here. Their attitudes are somewhat analogous to our penchant for overidealizing the govern ment systems abroad. What universal government systems abroad and in Canada have accomplished is to free the citizens from highcost episodes of serious illnesses, an accomplishment which appears to be forgotten after other problems emerge, both unintended and unexpected. Now cost containment is the political battle cry elsewhere as it is here. To contain cost, we start with PSRO, the descendant of utilization review mandated by the Medicare Act as a device to shorten length of stay and eventually to limit admissions. The trend may continue to monitor office visits as well-not to men tion admonishing patients to see the doctor only when necessary (a presumably precise judgment), and to strike a balance between hedonism and asceticism in their life styles.
The PSRO development is, indeed, remarkable. At first the profession fought it; now predictably it is likely to co-opt it; and I personally see no other alternative unless doctors are handed a manual of instructions to follow. This hardly seems either likely or tenable. If, in their judgment, the doctors are pressed too hard, they will sabotage the monitoring system by many subtle or not so subtle means at their disposal or threaten to strike on the seemingly unas sailable reason that good patient care is being jeopardized. Witness house officers in hospitals across the country-preceded by nurses-who brilliantly intrude into their bargaining processes the issue of proper professional standards for proper patient care. This is a tactic which has not been thought of, for example, by automobile assembly-line workers-who might claim that the quality of work manship is being jeopardized and in turn the quality of the cars com ing off the assembly line.
In attacking the cost imperative through the PSRO mechanism, I agree with Havighurst and Blumstein (1975:25) , as they put it in their cogent article, that Congress has not sufficiently faced the quality imperative, a powerful weapon in the professional arsenal: " Because the quality imperative dictates that no one should very ob viously enjoy better health care than anyone else on the basis of in come, the ideal to be striven for is likely to be higher." Further (Havighurst and Blumstein, 1975:41) , "A great deal of the discussion surrounding the PSRO concept in the period since its enactment has been rendered almost unintelligible by operation of the quality imperative in a highly charged political and professional en vironment."
T h e S itu a tio n After this rambling introduction, where are we? In my more rational moments I deplore broadside legislating for a performance monitoring mechanism such as PSROs before there is even the semblance of a systematic methodology to monitor performance ac cording to validated criteria. At the same time, in my more pragmatic moments, I agree that we need to work toward some form of performance monitoring, and the issue is then not the principle but the pace and form the performance monitoring will take. I will also observe that, admitting the desirability of some form of perfor mance monitoring, it is unlikely that the profession and the medical schQols would voluntarily initiate action and research on perfor mance criteria other than the ones they share informally among themselves in day-to-day practice. At least PSRO is forcing systematic attention to medical performance criteria which may not have come about otherwise. This is quite a charge considering the very considerable portion of medical practice which is considered an art rather than a science. It is a reasonable assumption, as Eliot Freidson (1970) puts forth forcefully in his writing, that the medical profession (indeed, any profession) is inclined to exaggerate the extent to which performance is beyond systematic monitoring, given the quality and equality imperative. A reasonable observation is that we do not know at pres ent to what extent medical practice is capable of being monitored ac cording to validated criteria, short of cookbook medicine, which nobody wants. Perhaps, the best that can be done is the strengthen ing of formal and informal peer review as is presumed to be done in well-organized group practices.
Very little research has been done on the methodology of monitoring physicians' services. A great deal of routine data needs to be collected on physicians' decision-making profiles. In Ontario, for example, the province compiles a tremendous data bank of physician decision-making profiles (Badgley et al., n.d.), but so far has done little with it in terms of comprehending decision-making in medical practices. The monitoring system exposes gross deviations from the average and calls the doctors so exposed into account. Similar methods are in use in the medical care foundations in California. I get the impression that the deviations are so gross that the deviant doctors would be known to their colleagues anyway, without the elaborate record system entailed to isolate these very few.
Medical decision making is, of course, a very difficult problem to analyze, not to mention developing a methodology for applica tion. Medical practice is essentially a one-to-one relationship between a doctor and a patient, and doctors face understandable dilemmas in making decisions on individual patients on the basis of group statistics. The tendency, I would assume, would be to err on the side of safety. Referring again to Havighurst and Blumstein (1975:23) : "It seems that sooner or later, government will have to face the dilemma of how to place limits on the commitment of funds to catastrophic disease. Its unwillingness to address this dilemma in the case of renal disease seems directly traceable to the advocates' ability to frame the issue in terms of identifiable rather than statistical lives.!' (Italics added.) Yes, indeed, it will take very sophisticated public policy decisions not to do something to save the lives of a few in favor of the many when the technology is present. Somehow in personal health services we do not like to deal with statistical lives, although we accept this concept in the carnage on our highways in order to have and drive our automobiles.
On a large-scale basis there appears to have been only two at tempts to set up monitoring standards for hospital admissions. Both studies took place in the 1960s. Anticipating the interest in physi cian decision making as it applied to hospital admissions and dis charges, I conducted a survey with Paul Sheatsley (1967) and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, of a representative sample of 2 ,0 0 0 surgical, medical, and diagnostic discharges in the state of Massachusetts for a 12-month period. Obstetrical cases were excluded. We queried the patients and their referring and attending doctors about the chain of events and deci sions that led to hospital admission and discharge within a few weeks after discharge.
One table stands out in that survey, relating to the doctors' judgments after the fact as to degrees of urgency in admitting their patients to the hospital. We established four categories of urgencynonurgency as determined by the attending doctors: ( 1) hospitaliza tion absolutely necessary, the procedures could not have been carried out except in the hospital; (2 ) quite urgent, would have been difficult to carry out procedures except in the hospital, although maybe possi ble outside; (3) would have been possible to carry out procedures out side of the hospital, but desired to reduce the margin of error; and (4) finally, made no difference.
The other survey (Fitzpatrick et al., 1962 ) was conducted on a representative sample of 5,000 discharges in Michigan. The Michigan study selected 18 diagnoses (including maternity cases) which were relatively clear-cut disease entities and for which it was quite easy for committees of physicians to arrive at a consensus for each diagnosis regarding appropriateness of hospital admission and discharge. These 18 diagnoses comprised 46 percent of all general hospital admissions. For the purpose here it is sufficient to sum marize that "overuse" represented 2.3 percent of the admissions and 6 .8 percent of the days. The Michigan study criteria were either/or instead of a range as formulated in the Massachusetts study. It is seen that in relying on professional criteria, there was very little purely wasteful use of hospital services. I refer to these old-but still new-surveys, because they are the only ones that have been done which give some idea of the "softness" of decision making among doctors for hospital admissions and, given a control mechanism, what proportion of admissions might be eliminated before both doctors and patients would begin to protest in visible numbers. I make the prediction that costs will continue to rise so that stabilized PSRO criteria will not be possible. Rising expecta tions and the quality imperative will continue to affect expenditures. Criteria need to be revised and tightened periodically unless the body politic is willing to accept what the medical profession as a whole and the public who seek their services regard as appropriate medical care.
O b s e rv a tio n s a n d C o n c lu s io n s
The legislation and discussion regarding PSROs appear to emphasize exclusively the role of doctors in decisions regarding their patients. The tendency is toward purely technical medical decision criteria and the ignoring of extenuating factors regarding the social and family environment of the patients and the patients' psy chological state.2 PSROs will, therefore, make medical practice even more technocratic and their alliance with administrative staffs of hospitals will allow patients even less to say about decision making in the enlarging bureaucracy than now. Can patient points of view be brought into the PSRO-type of decision monitoring? I am not sanguine. We are certainly entering a period of tensions and possible standoffs among patients, doctors, hospital managers, and govern ment funding agencies. Due-process suits from doctors are already appearing (Blum, 1976) .
While the United States tries to contain costs by monitoring physician decision making, the country is also laying the groundwork for a structure to contain supply as well in the newly implemented National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-641), following the failure of the com prehensive health planning and regional medical legislation in the late 1960s. In other countries the idea of monitoring physicians is following the creation of organizational structures, because costs are not contained by that means either. Thus, all countries are heading at various degrees of intensity in the direction of establishing planned limits to expansion, examining possibilities of monitoring physician decision making, and capping this with arbitrary budget ceilings.3 The actors can then sort themselves out in these contexts and arrive at some politically tolerable equilibrium. This seems to be the fate of health services delivery systems. 
